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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
---------------------------------------------------------
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK, 




A UTAH CORPORATION ET AL, 
Appellant-Defendants. 
Case No. 15773 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff-Respondant (hereinafter referred to as 
"bank") commenced this action to foreclose an assigned 
real estate mortgage. Defendant-Appellant (hereinafter 
referred to as "Corporation") counterclaimed to recover 
damages suffered because an officer, director and stock-
holder of the "bank" improperly obtained and used confiden-
tial information from the "corporation" loan application 
materials. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried before a jury. The Court direct-
ed a verdict against the "corporation's" counter-claim 
denying access to the jury. The "corporation" moved for sum-
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mary judgment based on a tender to the "bank" of all 
monies and interest accrued to the date on which the "Cor-
poration" became aware of the new mortgage holder. The 
Court denied this motion and in the subsequent directed ver-
dict, held against the "corporation" and allowed the "bank" 
to proceed with foreclosure. 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
1. The "corporation" seeks to have set aside the 
directed verdict against its counter-claim and be allowed to 
have the case ajudicated by a jury. 
2. The "corporation" seeks to have its motion for 
summary judgment granted or in the alternative to have the 
facts determined by a jury. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The "corporation" entered into a mortgage and note 
securing real property with LOIA R. HUGGINS and JOSEPH O. 
HUGGINS on September 28, 1972. Joseph O. Huggins died short· 
ly after the first annual payment was made by the "corpor-
ation" on the note. The property secured by the note and 
mortgage was the subject of the probate of the estate of 
Joseph O. Huggins until April 28, 1977. This note and 
mortgage were part of the financing and land acquisition 
by the "corporation" for development of Gateway West Mobile 
Home Estates, (herinafter referred to as Gateway West). 
(T-91, 197) 
- 2 -
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The "bank" was assigned the note and mortgage of 
Loia R. Huggins and Joseph O. Huggins in an instrument 
bearing the date of May 3, 1977. This instrument was re-
corded May 6, 1977. Suit was filed to foreclose on the 
note and mortgage on May 10, 1977. 
No notice of the transfer of interest was given to 
the "corporation". 
During the four and one-half year period prior to 
the time the "bank" gained its interest, neither Loia R. 
Huggins or Joseph 0. Huggins nor the estate of Joseph O. 
Huggins had taken any action either to accelerate the debt 
or to require strict compliance with the terms of the note 
and mortgage. 
The first knowledge that the "corporation" had that 
Commercial Security Bank had acquired Huggins' interest 
in the property was obtained when suit was filed. At this 
time, the "corporation" in writing, tendered all the princi-
pal and interest then due and owing. The "bankn refused to 
accept the funds so tendered and is currently refusing to 
accept such funds. (T-198) 
In the fall of 1972 through the fall of 1973, the 
circumstances relating to the "corporation's" counter-
claim occured. The "corporation" made application with 
the "bank", to secure financing to develop Gateway West. 
(T-92, 96) 
- 3 -
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The "corporation" worked with Gordon Belnap, vice 
president in charge of real estate, at Conunercial Security 
Bank during these negotiations. 
Gateway West was to be a four-star park, unique in 
northern Utah. The loan file of the "corporation" was 
violated by Alan Nye, a director and shareholder of the 
bank. He used information from the corporations file to 
build another park of the same quality as Gateway West. (T-611 
The market analysis in the loan file and the analysi:[ 
done by the bank indicated the market would bear only one 
park of this type. 
The bank refused to distribute the last $21,000.00 
of the loan. Because of these acts of the bank and its 
director, the "corporation" was unable to meet its obligation: 
and suffered damage. 
- 4 -
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ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DIRECTING A VERDICT AGAINST 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S COUNTER-CLAIM 
The Utah Court and courts in general have 
established a very high standard for granting directed 
verdicts. This is because of its drastic nature in the 
removing the case from the jury. In KOER vs. MAYFAIR 
MARKETS, 431 P.2d 566; 19 Utah 2d 339; 
" .•. All of the testimony and all reason-
able inferences flowing therefrom, which tend to 
prove the Plaintiff's case must be accepted as 
true, and all conflicts and all evidence which 
tend to disprove it must be disregarded. 
And therefore, the fundamental issue pre-
sented on this appeal is whether the evidence, 
viewed in the light most favorable to the 
Plaintiff, together with all reasonable inferences, 
was sufficient to submit the case to the jury. " 
(emp~1:> cdded) 
The Utah Supreme Court further explained the 
requirement and preference in relation to a directed verdict 
in SMITH vs. FRANKLIN, 376 P.2d 541; 14 Utah 2d 16; by 
expressing the invariable rule that any doubts should be 
resolved in favor of submitting disputed issues to a jury. 
Additional citations abound, but the general rule 
in Utah is found in the previously quoted cases and sum-
marized in CURTIS vs. HARMON ELECTRONICS, INC. 575 P.2d 1644; 
where the Court concluded that it would sustain a directed 
- 5 -
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could not find for the claimant even when the evidence is 
viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, 
while affording him the benefit of all inferences which the I 
evidence fairly supports. 
Under this standard, this case should have gone to 
the jury. When looking at all the facts presented by the 
"corporation," and drawing all reasonable conclusions from 
those facts, while disregarding any conflict in facts or 
evidence, it appears that a reasonable person could differ. 
- 6 -
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POINT TWO 
THE BANK HAD A DUTY NOT TO INTERFERE WITH THE CONTRACT 
RIGHTS OF CORPORATION NINE 
The basic relationship between the "bank" and the 
"corporation""was that of loan agen,:::y and client. This 
created a duty in the bank not to prevent Corporation Nine 
from performing on contracts for the development of Gateway 
West. 
In the process of applying for a loan, the 
"corporation" supplied the bank with detailed, confidential 
and valuable information regarding the viability and feasi-
bility of building a four-star mobile home park in Weber 
County. This information was supplied by Corporation Nine 
in the belief that the information would be used only in 
the loan approval process. Commercial Security Bank had a 
duty, because of the undertaking of the loan, to protect the 
information in this file. The "corporation" justifiably 
expected that no other use would be made of the information 
and that the file would be maintained in a confidential and 
appropriate manner. 
The bank's duty to the "corpor&tion" was breached 
by the acts of Alan Nye, an officer and director of Commercial 
Security Bank. . A bank may be liable for the act of its 
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officer or agent, even though he is acting soley for his own 
purpose, if such act is within the apparent scope of his 
authority." 10 Am Jur 2d, 105 Banks, Section 101. Mr Nye 
made improper and inappropriate use of the information 
contained in Corporation Nine's loan file. 
Mr. Nye looked through the entire loan file and 
asked if copies could be made of the information contained 
therein. (T-61, 62, and 80) The perusal of the loan file 
took place after the loan had been approved by the bank. 
(T-58, 62) 
Mr. Nye and Mr. Belnap, on several occasions, 
discussed the development of Mr. Nye's property. Mr. Nye 
indicated that he was not sure that a mobile home park was 
a good proposal until after he used the documents in 
Corporation Nine's file. (T-62) 
Mr. Belnap testified that Mr. Nye was taking a 
particular interest in the development of Gateway West. 
He made several visits to the site of the mobile home park 
during its construction. Mr. Belnap indicated that such a 
visit by a director was very unusual and out of the ordinary. 
(T-191) 
Mr. Belnap indicated, on another occasion, that 
Alan Nye was taking a particular interest in the development 
of the project. Mr. Belnap told Mr. New, "He (Nye) is lookir 
at everything you bring in, and he has got a piece of land, 
and he is going to build a park on it." (T-103) 
- 8 -
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The interest which Alan Nye exhibited in the park 
was highly unusual. Mr. Belnap testified that this was the 
only time that a director had taken such interest in a loan. 
When asked if he could remember any specific instance when 
Mr. Nye had looked at the "corporation's" file, Mr. Belnap 
replied; 
"I remember specifically because it is the 
only time it ever happened all the 17 years I 
was at the bank that a loan officer or director 
ever asked for someone's file." (T-62) 
Mr. Belnap knew what Mr. Nye was doing was improper. 
Belnap went along with it because, ". you don't tell a 
director what to do. He's the boss . 
There is a general duty for one party not to interfere 
with the contract rights of another. The Utah Court in SOTER 
vs. WASATCH DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, 21 Utah 2d 244, 443 P. 2d 
653, outlined the elements of interferrence with contract. 
"In order to establish a right to recover on 
such a cause of action the plaintiffs would have 
to show that the defendants, without justification, 
by some wrongful and malicious act, interfered 
with the plaintiffs right of contract, and an actual 
damage resulted." 
The bank owed such a duty of noninterferenoe to this 
"corporation" in all its activities, specifically in this 
suit in relation to the mortgage between Huggins and the 
"corporation." 
There is an additional duty once a contract has been 
entered not to prevent performance. This principle is so 
- 9 -
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eminently reasonable and so necessary to orderly commercial 
transactions that it hardly needs citation. "The act of one 
party to an entire contract in preventing a completion of 
the under taking gives a right of recovery. " 17 AmJur 2d 
Contracts Section 382. "There is no doubt that ordinarily 
if one exacts a promise from another to perform an act, the 
law implies a counter promise against arbitrary or unreason· 
able conduct on the part of the promisee." PSATY & FHURMAN 
vs. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF CITY OF PROVIDENCE, 68 A. 2d 32, as 
quoted in 10 ALR 2d 789. 
The "corporation" was involved in an operation ~ 
develop a mobile home park. This operation included the 
basic contract between the "corporation" and the "bank" for 
a loan. It also included a great number of contracts betwee· 
contractors and subcontractors, and several contracts to 
purchase property as well as various guarantees to Ogden Cit~ 
This appeal is in relation to a suit to foreclose on proper~ 
involved in one of these contracts. 
The bank breached its duty not to interfere with 
the contract between Corporation Nine and the Huggins in twc 
ways. First, the bank refused to disperse the final $21,00ij 
of the loan contract. Second, the bank, through Alan Nye, 
prevented performance on the contract between the "corporati 
and the Huggins. 
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Corporation Nine entered into a loan agreement with 
the "bank" to disperse $395,500.00. (T-116) Although 
Corporation Nine did nothing to breach this agreement, the 
bank refused to disperse the final $21,000.00 of this money. 
( T-1 7 3 , 10 3) Because of the refusal to disperse funds, the 
"corporation" was prevented from honoring its agreements. 
As a further consequence, the "corporation" was unable to put 
the necessary finishing touches on the park. The entrance to 
the park wasn't finished. The "corporation" wasn't able to 
put sod or trees around most of the spaces. There'was not 
sufficient funding to control the weeds. (T-104) Without 
these finishing touches, the park could not attract enough 
business to provide the necessary cash flow. 
The second interference was a direct result of Alan 
Nye's breach of the duty which the "bank" owed to the "cor-
poration." The success of Gateway West depended on a cash 
flow to pay the loan and other obligations, including the 
mortgage on the Huggins property. By misusing the infor-
mation in Corporation Nine's file and developing his own 
mobile home park, Monte Vista, Alan Nye prevented this cash 
flow from developing. Because of the lack of cash flow 
resulting from this breach, the "corporation" was unable to 
meet its obligations. 
If Mr. Nye had not been an officer of Commercial 
Security Rank, he would not have had access to the information 
- 11 -
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contained in the "corporation's" file. His acts, althou~ 
for his own interest, are attributable to the bank because 
of his position as a director and because of the duty of the 
"bank" not to interfere with the "corporation's" contracb. 
The damage to Corporation Nine is actual and real. ] 
Because of the interference with the contract, the "corpora· 
tion" was unable to maintain its mortgage payments and is 
now in danger of losing the property. 
In summary, the high standard established in Point 
One for the granting of a directed verdict should be applied 
to the facts set forth in Point Two. Reasonable men could 
differ as to the outcome of this case. The directed verdict 
should not have been granted. 
- :2 -
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POINT THREE. 
FORECLOSURE IS AN EXERCISE OF THE EQUITABLE JURISDICTION 
OF THE COURTS 
It is clear from the case law and the statute 
that foreclosure is governed by equitable principles. First 
National Bank of Salt Lake City, vs. Haymond, 89 Utah 115, 
57 P. 2d 1401, 1405. It is equally clear that foreclosure 
is in the nature of a forfeiture which the law does not 
favor. Jenson vs. Nielsen, 26 Utah 2d 96, 485 P. 2d 673; 
Jacobson vs Swan, 3 Utah 2d 59, 278 P. 2d 294. 
The fundamental purpose of the foreclosure is to 
insure payment of debts for which a mortgage stands as se-
curity, and foreclosure is allowed only when it is nec-
essary to carry out that objective. The Utah Court has 
made this abundantly clear in United States vs. Loosey, 
551 P. 2d 506, at 508; "The main purpose of a mortgage is 
to insure the payment of the debt for which it stands as 
security; and foreclosure is allowed when necessary to car-
ry out that objective." The Utah Supreme Court recently 
stated in State Bank of Lehi vs. Woolsey, 565, P. 2d 413, 
417; "Since a suit to foreclose a mortgage is an equitable 
action, the chancellor has the right to deny foreclosure 
based upon an acceleration where there are substantial 
equities which would render the acceleration unconscionable." 
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POINT FOUR. 
FORECLOSURE IN THE PRESENT SITUATION IS INEQUITABLE 
AND UNJUST 
The law in Utah regarding foreclosure is very clear. 
It is in the nature of a forefeiture and is disfavored. Its 
purpose is simply to guarantee payment of a debt. Fore-
closure based on acceleration may be denied if equity 
justifys. 
The facts in the present case are equally clear and 
uncontested. The "corporation" was always, willing and able 
to bring current all principal and interest due. 
It is clear and uncontested that in the four and one-
half years the Huggins held the mortgage, they at no time 
took action to accelerate the debt nor to demand strict com-
pliance with terms of the note and mortgage. Yet, within 
seven days of the mortgage assignment, this "bank" filed 
suit to foreclose on the mortgage. This suit by the "bank" 
was the first notice which the "corporation" had of any 
change of interest in the mortgage. 
It would be unjust to allow the "bank" to purchase the 
note and mortgage, then inunediately bring an action for fore-
closure without giving notice of their interest and their 
intent to require strict compliance. 
- 14 -
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To allow such action would encourage a type of 
modern day headhunting. An institution could look for 
mortgaged property in a situation similar to the "corpora-
tion's". Acquire that mortgage and then, within days and 
without any notice, proceed to foreclose on the mortgage. 
This type of action should be against public policy be-
cause the purpose of a mortgage and a foreclosure ac-
tion is to guarantee payment of a debt, not to facilitate 
land grabbing. 
In Woolsey, Supra, the Supreme Court held that if 
equity necessitates a foreclosure based on acceleration 
may be denied. In the present situation, the "bank" 
made no demand nor gave any notice of its intent to re-
quire strict compliance. When the "corporation" became 
aware of the change in interest, it immediately tendered 
all sums which were due and owing. 
To allow Commercial Security Bank to foreclose 
in this case becomes manifestly unjust in the light of 
Corporation Nine's continuing tender of the principal and 
interest. As is made abundantly clear in the cases, fore-
closure is only for the purpose of securing a debt, and an 
inequitable foreclosure based on acceleration must be 
denied 
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In order to satisfy the demands of equity the sum-
mary judgment should have been granted. 
Failing this appropriate remedy, the standard, pre-
viously enumerated in Point One regarding a directed ver-
dict, should be applied and the issue should be submitted 
to a jury. 
POINT FIVE 
THE ELEMENTS OF DAMAGE SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
CONSIDERED BY THE JURY AS AN OFFSET. 
Even if the Court were to find the counter-claim 
of the "corporation" were insufficient, the foreclosure shoui 
still be sent to the jury to determine if the damages claimei 
by the "corporation" are allowable offsets against the mar~ 
There would include the cost of the materials in 
Corporation Nine's file, the value of the corporate guarante; 
to bring Seventh Street through the Huggin's property, the 
cost of on-site improvements, and the other elements consti-
tuting damage on the counter-claim. 
CONCLUSION 
It is clear the bank owed the corporation a duty 
not to interfere with the contract rights of the "corpora-
tion" or to prevent perfomrance by the "corporation." It io 
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equally clear that Alan Nye, but for his position as "boss" 
would not have had access to the "corporation's" file. But 
for Nye's building a second park on the order and type of 
Gateway West, the "corporation" would not have suffered 
damage. 
Case law clearly defines the purpose of a mortgage 
and foreclosure. The only purpose of the foreclosure is to 
insure payments of the debt for which the mortgage stands as 
security. 
The bank made no demands for payment from the · 
corporation before filing suit. This is manifestly unjust 
in light of the prior four and one-half years in which strict 
compliance with the mortgage had not been required. This 
inequity becomes even more egregious in light of the 
"corporation's" continuing tender of all monies and interest 
due. 
Viewing both of the above issues on balance, they 
do not pass the high standard required for a directed verdict. 
If all the reasonable inferences are drawn from the "corpora-
tion's" evidence, while discounting the bank's evidence, 
reasonable people must differ with the Court's directed 
verdict. ,}~J,'1h~ 
C0011aQd C. ffiughes 
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